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R E F L E C T I V E  P R A C T I C E
John Bare, Ph.D., The Arthur M. Blank Family Foundation
Key Points
· Many foundations have substituted process ac-
countability for accountability for contributing to 
social change.
· While process accountability is important, it sets a 
floor, not an aspirational ceiling.
· There are tools—such as risk analysis, systems 
approaches, and game theory—that can help 
philanthropy engage in work on complex social 
problems that cannot be deconstructed into a 
series of small, linear projects.
· Seeking to extend basic human rights to more 
individuals around the world, seeking to reduce 
racism in a given city, or seeking to change public-
health norms in small town—all of these aspira-
tions require first a willingness to take on challeng-
es that defy short-term, causal, quantifiable results 
attributable to a best practice.
It is time to acknowledge that philanthropy’s ac-
countability movement is something other than 
what is advertised.
All foundations know the accountability check-
list. Avoid self-dealing. File your 990 on time. 
Pay the excise tax. Be transparent about your 
grant processes. Avoid excessive compensation. 
Avoid luxury perks for board members. Commit 
to board development. Do not bully nonprofits. 
Keep administrative costs low. Have HR establish 
annual performance reviews for individual staff 
members. Benchmark internal processes against 
those of other foundations. Seek cause-and-effect 
attribution regarding quantitative outcome tar-
gets for grants.
What is missing is an explicit recognition that 
this set of behaviors is about setting a floor for 
minimum standards. Treated as such, it is a 
useful thing. It is useful in the same way that the 
American Bar Association’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility defines the minimum standards 
lawyers must meet on ethics but does not de-
scribe what it takes to be a great, world-changing 
attorney. Every profession or field needs agreed-
upon minimum standards. Fall short of these 
minimums, expect to get dinged.
Yet for several reasons, philanthropy has treated 
the accountability movement as so much more.
Attentiveness to accountability is sometimes of-
fered up as a sufficient indicator of impact. These 
foundations point to their internal accountability 
efforts as evidence of a commitment to effective-
ness, despite the fact that funders can hit the 
mark on every accountability measure and still 
contribute nothing of external value to society. 
This bait-and-switch is convenient. It allows 
foundations to define success through internal 
metrics, not whether their social investments 
generate any transformative value for society.
For foundations, it is always easier to show suc-
cess on bright-line measures of accountability—
and take credit for success—than to pursue an 
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ambitious social change agenda, where definitions 
(much less measures) of success are murkier. 
When all else fails, it is easy enough to lower the 
standard used to define success, as states seem to 
have done under No Child Left Behind (de Vise, 
2007; Sturrock , 2007; Wallace, 2007). Account-
ability, in the end, is about defining the minimum 
level of acceptable performance, not the highest 
level of accomplishment we want to pursue.
Setting the Norm
As a field of practice, philanthropy has begun to 
use the accountability movement to establish a 
norm for what sound philanthropic investments 
should look like. This is where the serious harm 
can occur. The accountability movement requires 
that the norm be closer to the floor than the ceil-
ing. Foundations become locked into the notion 
that philanthropic investments must carry short-
term, unambiguous revelations of causal attribu-
tion. Simple, linear tools are sufficient to manage 
and evaluate these efforts.
This is a narrow view of what is possible. Within 
these limits, foundations are less likely to invest 
human or financial capital in complex change 
agendas, where outcomes are far removed from 
current interventions. The distance between 
today’s investments and tomorrow’s outcomes, of 
course, deprives current investors of the oppor-
tunity to take credit for any good that may occur. 
The ability to take credit is a key component of 
the accountability movement.
Adhering to the accountability movement re-
quires foundations to avoid social change agendas 
where outcomes cannot be easily quantified and 
where problems are too large for any one funder 
to produce. Accountability means being able to 
carve out the unique contribution of any individ-
ual funder, an impossibility in long-term, complex 
change efforts.
When foundations apply accountability tools to 
their grant-making approach, the tail ends up 
wagging the dog. Internal process draws more 
attention than external impact. In the same way, 
research shows that factory workers react to daily 
production targets by calibrating their effort, so 
as not to work too hard or too fast, in an effort to 
get the most pay out of the least work. The effect 
is to tamp down production (Surowiecki, 2005).
For foundations, when they attempt to decon-
struct complex social change agendas to create 
bite-size, measureable grant projects—those with 
quantifiable measures and easy attribution—the 
foundations lose contact with the larger purpose 
of their work. As Peter Block (2008) writes in 
challenging us to think differently about com-
munity transformation, we cannot assume that 
“an aggregation of individual changes” will add up 
to large-scale change. “The mindset that we can 
program and problem-solve our way into a vision 
does not take into account the complexity and 
relational nature of community,” Block writes.
Further, foundations investing through an ac-
countability model find themselves using fidel-
ity to process and plan as the determination 
of success. It is the same way in business: The 
accountability movement has distracted firms 
from the work of producing a great product or 
service. Instead, meeting the internal process 
metrics becomes the strategy itself, and it easily 
becomes corrupted (Hymowitz, 2005a; Hymowitz 
2005b). This is a great irony, and failure, of the 
accountability movement. Despite all the rhetoric 
about impact, the real tests are about compliance 
to process. And linking rewards to progress on 
short-term, tactical targets, especially financial 
goals, “causes people to game the system and in 
doing so destroy value,” Harvard business profes-
sor Michael Jensen (2003) writes in a paper, “Pay-
ing People to Lie”:
When foundations apply 
accountability tools to their grant-
making approach, the tail ends up 
wagging the dog. Internal process 
draws more attention than external 
impact.
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The accountability movement’s obsession with 
fidelity to process can be traced to the rise of 
standardized processes that powered mass 
production, which was organized by the “measur-
ing and coordinating of all of the activities of the 
manufacturing plant so that the speed and ef-
ficiency of these activities could match the speed 
and efficiency of the machines themselves” (Head, 
2003, emphasis added).
What George Eastman did for mass producing 
photographic film, what Henry Ford and Fred-
erick Winslow Taylor did for mass producing 
automobiles, and what James Buchanan Duke did 
for mass producing cigarettes all required precise 
control over and accountability to standard-
ized activities. When this accountability model 
is transferred to fields of medicine or customer 
service, the test is not about better outcomes. The 
test becomes fidelity to process, for example, phy-
sicians following “decision-making algorithms” 
designed by process engineers working for insur-
ance companies. The effect is to “subordinate the 
skills” and judgment and creativity of a profes-
sional to “an industrial, assembly line discipline” 
(Head, 2003).
In philanthropy, this aspect of the accountabil-
ity movement shows itself with human-service 
organizations being forced to serve both the re-
quirements of the funder and the needs of their 
client families. When teaching an evaluation 
class for nonprofit executives, I had one woman 
explain that her organization had a foundation 
grant to deliver health services to low-income 
families. The funder required all grantees to 
adhere strictly to the preferred implementation 
model. To keep their funding, grantees had to 
deliver detailed reports to the funder describ-
ing how they were following the model. For this 
executive, however, her staff had discovered 
that they could get better results by varying the 
model based on the needs of client families. 
Varying the model was not permitted. To keep 
the funder happy while also pursuing authentic 
social change for client families, the organization 
decided to keep two sets of books. The group 
used one set of reports to satisfy the evalua-
tion requirements of the funder. The second set 
of books accurately tracked the work and the 
outcomes.
The Challenge at Hand
The central thesis is this: Philanthropy’s over-
reaction to and overuse of tools anchored in the 
accountability movement have deprived founda-
tions and nonprofits from approaches that can 
better help them produce complex social change 
outcomes.
One result of this pathology is that philan-
thropy’s leaders have come to define success, 
and effectiveness, as being in compliance with 
minimum standards and not in violation of an 
expressed operational prohibition. This condi-
tion is at times a source of frustration and at 
times a convenient dodge for those seeking to 
aim for the floor and claiming to have reached 
the ceiling.
The good news: At hand is a more robust collec-
tion of tools that enable foundation and non-
profit executives to pursue, manage, and evaluate 
complex social change strategies as they unfold 
in real time. Following a discussion of the rise of 
the accountability movement, this article offers 
eight such tools. The set of tools offered here is 
intended to be generative, not exhaustive, and 
intended to be used in tandem with accountabil-
ity tools, not in place of them. The appropriate 
solution is to fit the right tools to the right jobs, 
addressing issues of minimum compliance and 
aspirational social change.
Philanthropy’s overreaction to 
and overuse of tools anchored 
in the accountability movement 
have deprived foundations and 
nonprofits from approaches that 
can better help them produce 
complex social change outcomes.
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In the discussions below, the examples are as-
sembled from a variety of fields of work. This is 
intentional, so as to illustrate how the sweeping 
accountability movement became so dominant 
that its management and evaluation practices 
were easily the tools of choice for foundation 
and nonprofit executives. Likewise, as useful 
alternatives become evident in various fields, it is 
appropriate for philanthropy to take note. Amass-
ing lessons from multiple fields of practice is a 
reminder of the power of borrowing and adapting 
tools already deployed for other uses.
A Larger Cultural Movement
Office Space, the 1999 Mike Judge film, shines 
light on the accountability movement that has 
dominated American life, certainly far beyond 
philanthropy.
In a key scene, Ron Livingston’s character, Peter 
Gibbons, meets with two consultants—evaluation 
consultants, in effect—who are on site to inter-
view staff ahead of layoffs. In describing the man-
agement at his firm, Gibbons explains that he has 
eight different bosses, with each waiting to jump 
on him if he makes a mistake:
Eight, Bob. So that means that when I make a mis-
take, I have eight different people coming by to tell 
me about it. That’s my only real motivation is not to 
be hassled, that and the fear of losing my job. But you 
know, Bob, that will only make someone work just 
hard enough not to get fired.
The scene reveals two critical shortcomings of the 
accountability movement. First, by articulating 
the minimum performance standard, it motivates 
individuals only to clear the lowest acceptable 
bar. Sports psychologists (Stevenson, 2006), for 
example, know that the threat of punishment for 
poor results, a key aspect of the accountability 
movement, “generally isn’t the most effective 
way to motivate someone.” Second, the culture 
equates success with avoiding (or at least hiding) 
mistakes. Both variables inhibit the pursuit of 
ambitious, long-term efforts to transform society.
The Office Space scene is a dramatic illustration of 
the “gotcha” element of our culture, where oppo-
nents stay ready to pounce on any misstep or flaw. 
In our politics, we are left with a constant state of 
tit-for-tat charges that creates a continual cycle 
of investigation and accusation. Success, again, is 
equated with no one spotting any mistakes that can 
lead to a “gotcha” moment. Given that humans are 
flawed, mistakes are inevitable. Thus success can 
only be achieved by doing nothing. So in practice, 
individuals most likely to succeed in the account-
ability movement tend to be managers who main-
tain their position while doing as little as possible.
Then-Vice President Al Gore appeared on David 
Letterman’s late-night show on Sept. 8, 1993, 
to poke fun at this “gotcha” culture, which he 
believed was inhibiting the federal government’s 
ability to improve the social condition. To point 
out the folly of federal procurement regulations, 
Gore put on protective eyeglasses and used a ham-
mer to smash a glass ash tray. In a scene that could 
have come from Office Space, Gore explained that 
government rules said ash trays “should break 
into a small number of irregular shaped pieces 
not greater in number than 35” (Gruber, 2003). 
Gore’s point: With so much time and money spent 
monitoring the nature of ash tray breakage, it is a 
wonder anything substantive gets done.
Gore’s effort, formally known as the National 
Partnership for Reinventing Government, had 
In our politics, we are left with a 
constant state of tit-for-tat charges 
that creates a continual cycle of 
investigation and accusation. 
Success, again, is equated with no 
one spotting any mistakes that can 
lead to a “gotcha” moment. Given 
that humans are flawed, mistakes 
are inevitable. Thus success can only 
be achieved by doing nothing. 
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an ambitious mission. President Clinton (1993) 
explained that the effort would “make the entire 
Federal Government both less expensive and 
more efficient, and to change the culture of our 
national bureaucracy away from complacency and 
entitlement toward initiative and empowerment. 
We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate 
the entire National Government.”
In the end, Gore failed to move political and 
media classes away from the accountability cul-
ture and onto more substantive issues facing the 
ountry. As shown in Figure 1,1 the accountability 
movement continued in ascent after 1993. This 
content analysis provides a quick way to observe 
the degree to which the national conversation has 
been focused more on accountability or more on 
social change agendas.
Back in 1981, the first year of the analysis, the 
terms “accountability” and “social change” received 
1 Graph was created using the “Advanced Search” function 
at the New York Times Web site, http://query.nytimes.com/
search/alternate/query?query=&st=fromcse. For each year, 
1981–2008, I carried out separate searches for the term 
“accountability” and a search for the term “social change.” 
The Times Web site reports a total number of stories or 
articles that include at least a single mention of the term in 
question. The count reported is a tally of the total number 
of stories or articles that include the term in question. The 
term in question may appear once or more in each entry. 
The Web site search was current as of June 19, 2009. 
about the same number of mentions in the New 
York Times. Since then, “accountability” has domi-
nated the national conversation. Through two Iraqi 
wars, an impeachment trial of a president, a failed 
presidential vote-counting system, and the rise of 
digital media, there has been a rise in the number 
of proclamations of accountability and charges of 
failure to maintain accountability. The more nu-
anced idea of “social change” has not yet become a 
substantial part of the national conversation.
It Turns Out Everyday Life Is Complex
There is a place for the accountability movement, of 
course. It is well-suited to the clarity associated with 
minimum standards, such as a ban on foundation 
self-dealing. And every field, philanthropy included, 
needs agreed-upon minimum standards. These are 
the non-negotiables, the lines we shall not cross. Yet 
as much as we need these bottom-line standards, 
these are only a necessary component of a strong 
philanthropy sector. We also need to challenge our-
selves to pursue greater and higher aspirations than 
are defined by accountability regulators.
As with any instruments, accountability tools can 
be overused. Figure 1 shows this almost certainly 
is the case here. As the accountability movement 
has become dominant, the associated manage-
ment and evaluation practices have been applied 
in almost every setting without regard to whether 
the tools ideally are suited to the situation.
Figure 1  Annual “Accountability” and “Social Change” Mentions in the NYT, 1981–2008
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A telltale buzzword is “simple.” The accountability 
movement thrives on the notion that everything 
can be reduced to a simple, linear approach. In 
general for the business world, the term “complex-
ity” equates to bloated, wasteful operating ineffi-
ciencies (Ashkenas, 2007). There is no acknowledg-
ment of the need to differentiate behavior to suit 
the complexity of the system in which an individual 
is working. Complexity is viewed as a problem to 
remedy, not as a characteristic of a system.
Some people have challenged this conventional 
wisdom. University of Michigan business profes-
sor Karl Weick (Coutu, 2003) urges leaders to 
be skeptical of ideas presented as simple. This is 
because we are operating in a world that is quite 
complex, and “leaders must complicate them-
selves in order to keep their organizations in 
touch with the realities of the business world. My 
worry when executives say, ‘Keep it simple, stu-
pid,’ is that they’re underestimating the complex-
ity of their own organizations and environments.”
Comparing dominoes to pick-up sticks helps 
make the distinction. Constructing a traditional 
logic model is akin to setting up a string of domi-
noes, where knocking over a single domino sets 
off a chain reaction and topples every subsequent 
domino in succession. The string may be long and 
may even be elaborately designed. But the system 
is always linear and simple. And as with any 
simple logic chain, we can always pinpoint which 
input (i.e., which domino) must topple to produce 
a specific output (i.e., the next domino in the 
line). Each output then becomes the input for the 
next connection in the line of falling dominoes. 
Here accountability rules may fit well.
On the other hand, consider the game of pick-up 
sticks, where each player in the game attempts 
to remove a single stick from the pile without 
moving any of the other sticks. This is closer to 
real life, where interconnections make it difficult 
to touch one aspect of public life without affect-
ing another. In fact, we can make the game even 
more real. Imagine the game where every player 
is moving sticks at the same time. Now it is nearly 
impossible to predict exactly how the pile will 
move. We are left with little or no horizon for 
planning, as each player in the game moves sticks 
whenever they want.
In this volatile setting where linear planning ap-
proaches do not carry much value, what we need 
are robust tools that emphasize a continuous 
cycle of feedback and rapid adjustment.
Dominoes places a premium on a very precise 
plan. Winners are those who do the best job of 
designing and sticking — exactly — to the plan. 
Dominoes greatly reduces, and may even elimi-
nate, uncertainty.
Precise plans do not carry much value in the 
real-world version of pick-up sticks. Here winners 
are those who can most rapidly harvest, process, 
and act on feedback, in real time. To achieve great 
results in complex situations where the world 
around us is messy and unpredictable, we have to 
adapt as we go. In complex situations there is no 
chance of eliminating uncertainty. The best we 
can do is reduce uncertainty.
Foundations investing through an accountability 
model are essentially limiting themselves only to 
problem-solving opportunities that line up neatly 
like a chain of dominoes. Or they ignore the com-
plexities of the issues confronting them and force 
an overlay of simple tools and interventions. In 
either case, the effect of the accountability model 
is to limit the benefits that accrue to society.
What Works? Versus What Works, for 
Whom, Under What Circumstances, for 
How Long?
The Obama administration is contributing to the 
myth that we can impose simple processes on 
complex situations. First Lady Michelle Obama 
reinforced the bias in announcing the $50 million 
White House Social Innovation Fund: “The idea 
is simple: to find the most effective programs 
out there and then provide the capital needed to 
replicate their success in communities around 
the country that are facing similar challenges” 
(Hrywna, 2009).
The truth is it is not so simple. In response to 
President Obama’s recommendation to put 
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federal funding behind a single program (presum-
ably, in the First Lady’s words, the one program 
deemed “the most effective”) to help mothers 
with young children, four experts published a 
letter to the White House arguing for a more 
flexible approach. The authors are Deborah Daro, 
research fellow at University of Chicago’s Chapin 
Hall; Ken Dodge, Duke University professor of 
public policy; Heather Weiss, founder of the Har-
vard Family Research Project; and Edward Zigler, 
emeritus professor of psychology at Yale.
They are evaluators focused on the impact of 
government and foundation interventions. These 
experts are not soft touches. Their public posi-
tion serves as proof that acknowledgment of 
complex systems does not equate to a post hoc, 
wait-and-see approach ready to declare whatever 
happens as a relevant outcome. The experts here 
argue for an approach that they believe would 
touch more children and families with more 
good outcomes:
The President’s decision to invest in home visitation 
for newborns represents an important public policy 
choice and one we fully support and applaud. The 
proposed strategy for building this new system, how-
ever, gives us cause for concern. We do not believe 
the current structure of this policy will achieve maxi-
mum impacts and benefits for the next generation of 
young Americans (Daro et al., 2009).
The quartet’s central objection is one that needs 
to be raised across government policy and phi-
lanthropy: That there are no one-size-fits-all solu-
tions to complex social issues. The accountability 
movement’s inclination to codify “what works” 
and then require the approved protocol to be ap-
plied universally has led to the misuse of results 
of randomized trials and resulted in the failure to 
maximize impacts.
In truth, there are no universal “what works” 
answers, at least when the programs involve hu-
man beings. Instead, sophisticated experimental 
designs yield evidence on what tends to work for 
whom, for how long, under what circumstances, 
and so on. Every first-year methods student 
knows this. Yet these qualifications are dropped 
when accountability champions, including the 
White House, look to use evaluation results to 
select a single “what works” program to imple-
ment across the board. Those seduced by the 
apparent simplicity of the accountability move-
ment somehow dismiss Campbell’s (Cook and 
Campbell, 1979) questions of external validity in 
their entirety.
Here is how the Daro-Dodge-Weiss-Zigler letter 
explains problem:
An underlying requirement of the President’s home 
visitation initiative is that it contains only models 
that have been proven effective through randomized 
clinical trials. We do not disagree with the unique 
role such trials can play in identifying promising 
interventions and new policy opportunities. Ran-
domized control trials offer some assurance that in-
vestments made in a given policy direction will have 
desired impacts on program participants and gener-
ate short- and long-term savings. However, knowing 
that a program is capable of achieving effects under 
ideal conditions is not the same as knowing it will 
achieve effects when broadly implemented with more 
challenged populations or in more poorly resourced 
communities. In the real world, the success of a 
home visitation program will depend on how local 
parents from all points on the risk continuum view 
early intervention services, what service and provider 
characteristics will attract new parents into these 
programs, and the relation between these efforts and 
other elements within a community’s existing service 
continuum.
In many respects the core features of a well-done 
randomized trial—a highly specified intervention, 
consistent implementation, and a specific target 
population—limit the ability to generalize its findings 
to diverse populations and diverse contexts. Contrary 
to what some have suggested, we know of no evalu-
ation scholar who would conclude that randomized 
In truth, there are no universal 
“what works” answers, at least when 
the programs involve human beings.
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trials provide sufficient insight for making program 
replication decisions.
The single model reflected in the President’s proposal 
(Nurse Family Partnership) is an outstanding home 
visitation program and has been proven effective in 
achieving several outcomes suggestive of potential 
cost savings. These outcomes, however, have been 
largely limited to young women who enrolled in 
services early in their first pregnancy. Although some 
of the participants present significant risks that work 
against good parenting practices including young 
maternal age, low income, single parent status, and a 
range of mental health challenges, as a group they do 
not fully represent populations often found to domi-
nate public welfare caseloads nor those reported 
for maltreatment, areas where the current proposal 
hopes to achieve significant long-term savings. Based 
on the 2006 birth data available from CDC, a unique 
focus on first-time parents would leave about 62 
percent of newborns ineligible for service (about 
2.7 million births). Further, infants in the foster care 
system are eight times more likely than other infants 
to have mothers who received no prenatal care—a 
reality that would have precluded these women from 
accessing Nurse Family Partnership.
Fortunately, other well-researched home-based 
interventions have been found effective in achiev-
ing positive outcomes with these more troubling 
populations, and they have accomplished their 
objectives without employing nurses. The concept of 
early home visitation is being taken to scale in many 
communities across the country, some of which 
have invested in a model similar to that proposed by 
the President while some follow other models such 
as Parents as Teachers, Healthy Families America, 
Home Instruction for Parents of Preschool Young-
sters, Parent-Child Home program and Early Head 
Start. These efforts have been studied by multiple 
investigators, and the findings have been used to im-
prove program structure, staff training, and outcome 
documentation. In developing the parameters for the 
President’s proposal, we would encourage you to give 
careful attention to this full body of research.
Another telling example comes from Dr. Jerome 
Groopman and Dr. Pamela Hartzband (2009), 
both Harvard Medical School faculty and on 
staff at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in 
Boston. They describe the misuse and overuse 
of bright-line accountability practices. As they 
explain in the Wall Street Journal, tools suited to 
minimum standards do not work when applied to 
complex medical situations where every patient 
needs to be considered individually.
At the outset, the doctors acknowledge the 
positive power of accountability metrics. Recent 
federal projects designed to improve Medicare 
quality have had positive effects. Imagining a hos-
pital “as a large factory where systems needed to 
be standardized to prevent avoidable errors,” new 
protocols and guidelines regarding hand washing 
have reduced patient infections.
As part of the regulatory oversight, doctors who 
not comply with the new guidelines draw negative 
public recognition and suffer financially. This is 
an important and relentless force within the ac-
countability movement: Not following the plan is 
what is punished.
However, what worked with hand washing may 
not work so clearly with more complex clinical 
care decisions. Groopman and Hartzband (2009) 
explain that regulators reviewed competing ap-
proaches to medical care and decided to mandate 
that hospitals keep blood-sugar levels within a 
very narrow range among ICU patients. This 
became a metric on report cards that judge per-
formance of hospitals and doctors—and thus one 
criterion by which punishments and rewards were 
meted out. Keeping the blood-sugar levels within 
the narrow range would be rewarded. Varying the 
care would draw serious punishment.
Yet now studies show more patients are dying 
when their blood-sugar levels are tightly con-
trolled. Patients receiving more flexible care do 
better. The “what works,” it turns out, depends on 
the conditions of the patient. Cookie-cutter ac-
countability solutions that work well on minimum 
standards, such as with hand washing, are not 
robust enough to work with more complex issues.
The case shows “why rigid and punitive rules to 
broadly standardize care for all patients often 
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break down,” Groopman and Hartzband write, 
pointing to Orwell and Kafka as models for to-
day’s accountability regulators:
Human beings are not uniform in their biology. 
A disease with many effects on multiple organs, 
like diabetes, acts differently in different people. 
Medicine is an imperfect science and its study is also 
imperfect. Information evolves and changes. Rather 
than rigidity, flexibility is appropriate in applying 
evidence from clinical trials. … And what is best 
sometimes deviates from the norms. Yet too often 
quality metrics coerce doctors into rigid and ill-
advised procedures.
Differentiating Between Simple, 
Complicated, and Complex Systems
Foundations and nonprofits are continually urged 
to adopt leading practices from the business sec-
tor. So philanthropy should take note when Har-
vard Business Review publishes an article (Hall 
and Johnson, 2009) asserting that “the movement 
to standardize processes has gone overboard.”
Joseph Hall and Eric Johnson, faculty members 
at Dartmouth’s Tuck School of Business, have 
figured out what many foundation and nonprofit 
staff have felt in their gut: In many settings flex-
ible processes yield better results than standard-
ized processes. Moreover, “process standardiza-
tion can undermine the very performance it’s 
meant to optimize.”
This runs counter to more than 100 years of prac-
tice, largely driven by the Industrial Revolution’s 
launch of modern manufacturing technology. As 
Hall and Johnson report, by tradition “manage-
ment calls for blindly reducing variability.” Six 
Sigma programs and management training world-
wide teach and reward process standardization. 
Yet the authors contend that individuals should 
be able to recognize when there is volatility in the 
environment and volatility with inputs or outputs 
(or both). In these cases, processes require more 
“art” than science.
Consider the authors’ story about Ritz-Carlton 
executives, who traditionally required staff to 
follow precisely a 20-point checklist on customer 
service. That is classic accountability, with the 
focus on compliance—following the checklist—
and not the ultimate satisfaction of customers. In 
2006 Ritz-Carlton executives figured out this rigid 
approach was no longer sufficient. The nature 
of their guests, and thus their guest needs, was 
varied. Expanding the customer-service script was 
deemed impractical. In its place, staff was encour-
aged to “use their judgment and improvise,” basing 
their service on a unifying set of corporate values.
Instead of rewarding employees for following 
a predetermined script (“always carry a guest’s 
luggage”), the new system rewarded employees 
for their ability to figure out, understand, and 
respond to guests’ specific needs. In the end, Ritz-
Carlton guests gave higher marks for customer 
service.
Hall and Johnson zero in on exactly what is re-
quired to move beyond the accountability move-
ment’s minimums to take on more ambitious 
social change efforts: recognizing that different 
types of systems require different approaches.
The traditional simple, linear system is based on 
a manufacturing model. If we change a gear or 
alter the speed of an assembly line, it is easy to 
predict how these changes will ripple throughout 
the entire system. And if we run widgets through 
the same system under the same conditions, we 
are pretty certain of observing the same effects on 
all of the widgets. Obsessive adherence to process 
standardization is how companies such as Coca-
Cola can efficiently produce millions of bottles 
and cans of soda every day, with no unintended 
variation.
Trouble arises when we transfer this approach to 
systems involving human beings, each of whom is 
different. As obvious as this may seem, philanthro-
py has struggled to move beyond simple, linear 
logic models that assume social programs are 
driven by precise gears and belts and that individ-
uals running programs and receiving interventions 
react as predictably as aluminum or steel.
In their 2006 book Getting to Maybe, Westley, 
Zimmerman, and Patton (2006) force us to con-
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front this distinction by articulating the char-
acteristics of simple, complicated and complex 
systems (see Table 1).
The key here is the following: The more complex 
the system, the less likely we can simply follow a 
plan and expect any certainty in the outcome. The 
more complex the system, the more important it 
is to identify the right feedback sources and the 
optimal frequency and nature of feedback.
It challenges our tradition of problem solving to 
consider that success could ultimately depend 
less on following a plan and more on tracking and 
reacting to the right feedback systems. Traditional 
problem-solving models tend to start with the 
task of defining the problem and then hinge on 
implementing the agreed-upon course of action. 
Block (2008) explains that these models do not 
easily accommodate ongoing feedback or changes 
in the system during implementation.
To move beyond this, we should reconsider 
even our everyday understanding of feedback. 
We tend to imagine positive feedback as praise, 
negative feedback as a scold. With a systems ap-
proach, however, feedback is the mechanism by 
which we affirm a decision or make a course cor-
rection. Negative feedback becomes an essential 
tool in our effort to increase the likelihood of a 
positive outcome. Negative feedback is neither 
summative nor punitive. It is only an indication 
that a change is needed. In the most basic ex-
ample, consider a self-organizing, self-correcting 
system, such as your home thermostat. This 
system is based on negative feedback. The ther-
mostat is set to react to extra warm air by making 
things cooler. It reacts to extra cool air by making 
things warmer.
To recognize the importance of feedback, we first 
must be able to recognize the nature of the system 
in which we are working. The key is to differenti-
ate between simple and complex systems, as the 
Getting to Maybe team urges. New York Times 
columnist David Brooks, commenting on findings 
from a longitudinal study tracking two groups of 
men for nearly 70 years, recognizes this distinc-
tion. In describing how the study explains varia-
tions in the lives of the men, Brooks marveled 
at the “stream of suggestive correlations” from 
variables linked to health, happiness, and general 
well-being. But more interesting to Brooks was 
what the research could not simplify: “It’s the 
Following a Recipe Sending a Rocket to the Moon Raising a Child
The recipe is essential Formulas are critical and necessary Formulas have a limited 
application
Recipes are tested to ensure easy 
replication
Sending one rocket increases 
assurance that the next will be OK
Raising one child provides 
experience but no assurance of 
success with the next
No particular expertise is 
required, but cooking expertise 
increases success rate
High levels of expertise in a variety 
of fields are necessary for success
Expertise can contribute but is 
neither necessary nor sufficient 
to ensure success
Recipes produce standardized 
products
Rockets are similar in critical ways Every child is unique and must 
be understood as an individual
The best recipes give good 
results every time
There is a high degree of certainty 
of outcome
Uncertainty of outcome remains
Notes the quantity and nature of 
“parts” needed
Separate into parts and then 
reassemble and coordinate
Cannot separate the parts from 
the whole; essence exists “in 
the between” in the relationship 
between elements 
TABLE 1 Simple, Complicated and Complex Problems
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baffling variety of their lives that strikes one the 
most. … There is a complexity to human affairs 
before which science and analysis simple stands 
mute” (emphasis added).
In much the same way, in his 2007 commence-
ment speech at Harvard, Bill Gates (2007) was 
explicit about the need to adjust our approaches 
to suit the complexity of the issues before us:
All of us here in this Yard, at one time or another, 
have seen human tragedies that broke our hearts, and 
yet we did nothing—not because we didn’t care, but 
because we didn’t know what to do. If we had known 
how to help, we would have acted.
The barrier to change is not too little caring; it is too 
much complexity.
To turn caring into action, we need to see a problem, 
see a solution, and see the impact. But complexity 
blocks all three steps.
This central argument—that “the barrier to 
change is not too little caring; it is too much 
complexity”—represents a shift in American 
thought.
A generation ago, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s (1966) 
observation about our response to global popula-
tion growth is notable for the differing point of 
view. The problem “is soluble by means we have 
discovered and with resources we possess. What 
is lacking is not sufficient knowledge of the solu-
tion but universal consciousness of the gravity of 
the problem and education of the billions who are 
its victims.” This shift is critical to understanding 
the value of the accountability movement, then 
and now.
In situations where solutions are evident and 
resources are at hand, where there is sufficient 
knowledge, then bright-line accountability tools 
are highly useful. When all that is required is 
caring or consciousness, it is inexcusable not to 
implement the remedy. This minimum standard 
of performance can be enforced through account-
ability. Failing to meet the standard should draw 
punishment. As an example, all that was required 
to decrease hospital infections was to mandate 
hand washing.
Now, today, Gates is encountering a set of 
global problems where the situation has flipped. 
No longer is caring enough. Solutions are not 
evident. As Gates and other leaders shift their 
attention to these types of complex social dilem-
mas, the accountability tools suited to problem 
solving a generation ago are less useful. Success 
cannot be realized through following a plan or 
implementing the agreed-upon set of activi-
ties. Uncertainty cannot be eliminated. Success 
will depend on identifying and reacting to the 
most powerful feedback variables — and making 
adjustments at each decision point that increase 
the chances of contributing to some social 
change.
Education: A Case Study in Evaluation, 
Accountability, and Social Change
Education, especially high school reform, is one of 
the complex issues in the sight lines of the Gates 
Foundation.
The challenge before the country—educating 
millions of school children so that all reach their 
potential—is more like our messy game of pick-
up sticks than toppling a chain of prearranged 
dominoes. It is a volatile environment, where 
everything is changing at once. Individuals 
themselves arrive at school with diverse needs. 
Individual students react differently to different 
stimuli over time. Teachers, principals, and par-
ents are in continual states of change. Students 
are constantly subjected to changing outside 
influences.
Despite these multiple moving targets, educa-
tion has traditionally relied on an accountability 
approach focused on minimum standards and 
punishments for failing to clear the bar. High-
stakes tests tend to be set up as pass-fail markers 
for kids and schools. In some cases, students who 
do not meet the minimum standard do not pass 
a grade or graduate. With other tests, a predeter-
mined share of student test takers must meet a 
minimum score or else teachers, or perhaps the 
entire school, suffer some punishment.
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Most notable is that all of these evaluation tools 
provide feedback after the intervention has 
come to a close. In short, the evaluation results 
arrive at a moment when it is too late to make 
any improvements, to make any changes. This 
is the case with end-of-year report cards. Once 
schools or students receive their final report 
cards, there is very little anyone can do to act on 
the information. As a result, education’s account-
ability approach does a terrific job of producing 
snapshots of low performers, and then punishing 
them. Yet the approach contributes little or noth-
ing to bringing about large-scale social change 
that would alter the course for these students and 
schools.
In education, the accountability movement has 
not produced social change. The deficiencies that 
launched recent education reform models, and 
the prior reform models, remain.
What we are left with are stories like the ones Jay 
Matthews (2009) tells. Matthews is the educa-
tion reporter for the Washington Post and author 
of a 2009 book on the KIPP charter school 
model and its founders, David Levin and Mike 
Feinberg.
As new college graduates who entered the 
classroom through Teach for America and not 
through a traditional university education pro-
gram, Levin and Feinberg were essentially insur-
gents challenging the existing bureaucracy—and 
thus challengers to the process standards of the 
accountability system. Levin and Feinberg were 
focused on authentic outcomes. For them, this 
meant helping low-income elementary school 
students in Texas learn and achieve so they could 
improve their lives. This meant the two teach-
ers were highly flexible in what they would do to 
bring about this result. In fact, they were willing 
to try most anything — and did — to help their 
students.
Their commitment to social change recalls the 
value articulated by Franklin Roosevelt (1932), 
who in a college commencement address made 
the case for action, however flawed: “The country 
needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the coun-
try demands bold, persistent experimentation. It 
is common sense to take a method and try it. If it 
fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above 
all, try something.”
We see the same admonition from evaluator 
Donald Campbell, whose essay “The Experi-
menting Society” (Campbell and Russo, 1999) 
makes the case for what he calls action research: 
“Faced with a choice between innovating a new 
program or commissioning a thorough study 
of the problem as a prelude to action, the bias 
would be toward innovating.” Leaping in to act, 
of course, raised the importance of feedback, 
which Campbell recognized through his call for 
“trial-and-error.” 
Social change efforts, in contrast with the ac-
countability movement, greatly favor trying 
something, anything, to disrupt the status quo. 
Too often accountability models end up reinforc-
ing the status quo.
Accountability rewards following the plan or 
script. If the outcomes are not realized, it is not 
the fault of the individuals following the plan. 
They followed instructions. Individuals are ac-
countable for following the rules established by 
whatever authority is managing the accountability 
system. Thus, Levin was poorly received because 
he would not agree to teach the same way all the 
others were teaching. Levin found some faculty 
“were openly hostile to him,” and once in the 
school parking lot his tires were slashed (Mat-
thews, 2009).
Social change efforts, in contrast 
with the accountability movement, 
greatly favor trying something, 
anything, to disrupt the status quo. 
Too often accountability models end 
up reinforcing the status quo.
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At the time in Texas (1994), the driving force 
in the accountability movement was the Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills test. The ac-
countability movement set a minimum standard: 
at each school, a predetermined percentage of 
students from every racial-ethnic subgroup must 
pass the test. If not, the school would receive a 
negative rating, which would reflect poorly on the 
principal. Levin had 11 low-performing students 
in his class that were of particular concern to his 
principal.
As Matthews tells the story: “The best way to 
avoid an unsatisfactory rating,” Levin was told 
by school staff, “was to exempt those 11 students 
from taking the test”:
This could be done if their teacher or their parents 
signed a statement saying that their language skills 
were not adequate to take the test or that they had 
learning disabilities that would make it unfair to 
judge their progress by that exam. Levin was told to 
fill out and sign the exemption forms. Other teachers 
were doing the same. …
Levin refused to sign. … He wanted his students to 
qualify for one of the magnet middle schools, which 
he hoped would challenge them in the same way that 
he had been challenging them. Some of the magnet 
middle schools started in the fifth grade. If his fourth 
graders took the TAAS exam and received good 
scores, they had a chance to move to the magnet 
right away.
Levin persuaded the parents of his students that 
the children were ready to perform. So when 
school officials bypassed Levin and asked the 
parents to sign the form required to keep the kids 
from participating in the TAAS exam, the parents 
refused.
The results showed Levin had been correct to 
focus on preparing his students, not on finagling 
a way to avoid putting the school at risk of not 
meeting the state standard. Levin wanted more 
than loopholes to ensure minimum compliance. 
He wanted social change. In the end, his students 
performed wonderfully on the test, which kept 
the school off the watch list.
The reaction of the principal? He fired Levin. He 
did so by making a big show of the firing during 
class one day. The explanation: insubordination.
Insubordination may be the iconic symbol of the 
accountability movement, as it articulates a pun-
ishment for not following the process standard 
even when, in Levin’s case, an alternative ap-
proach yields the best result.
Although Levin’s response put him in the minor-
ity of professionals willing to challenge directly 
the accountability bureaucracy, this characteristic 
is a key indicator of an individual committed to 
bringing about change. Foundations interested in 
social change must invest in these types of indi-
viduals, these “transformed nonconformists.”
At the opening plenary of the 2009 annual con-
ference of the Council on Foundations, More-
house College President Dr. Robert Franklin 
(2009) reminded several hundred foundation 
staff in attendance that philanthropy cannot 
advance social change by supporting current 
practices. Drawing on quotes from Dr. King, he 
said: “This hour in history needs a dedicated 
circle of transformed nonconformists. The sav-
ing of our world from pending doom will come, 
not from the action of a conforming majority, 
but from the creative maladjustment of a trans-
formed minority. Dr. King maintained there was 
a difference between the social consequences 
of conforming majorities and the creative and 
redemptive maladjustment of the few who see 
possibilities in every crisis.”
In the accountability movement, the “conforming 
majorities” are those who put process compliance 
ahead of social change. The idea of a “transformed 
nonconformist” defining success as compliance 
with accountability rules tilts toward oxymo-
ronic. The accountability movement, almost by 
definition, depends on an “conforming majority” 
unwilling to question the orthodoxy.
Education Innovation: Evaluation for  
Social Change
In education, blind compliance to process has 
resulted in numerous examples of cheating, fraud, 
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and data manipulation (Popham, 2006), always in 
an attempt to avoid the punishments built into ac-
countability systems as the response for not meet-
ing a minimum standard.3 One of the most recent 
examples comes from Georgia (Judd 2009), where 
administrators at five schools are under inves-
tigating for changing students’ answers on tests 
to improve overall school performance. Another 
high-profile case has surfaced in Chicago, where 
high schools were found to be counting students 
as present, day after day, long after the students 
had dropped out.
The reason for the cheating? The accountabil-
ity model punishes schools for truancies and 
absences. The Chicago Tribune (Ahmed, 2009) 
reports that city schools already lose $18 to $20 
million each year because students are missing 
days. As with most accountability models, the 
system is set up to report year-end statistics, 
which affect annual funding decisions, but it is 
not set up to improve or change the situation. 
The accountability system is intended to count 
students who drop out, not help teachers and 
schools prevent students from dropping out. 
“When you have that kind of pressure, human 
beings tend to cheat,” says William Gerstein, a 
high school principal. “There is a lot of incen-
tive … to report students present on days they 
missed.”
Unlike a thermostat, which responds to heat or 
cold by providing resources to change the status 
quo once the current situation becomes unac-
ceptable, accountability systems simply identify 
and punish performance outside the desired 
range. Further, the model focuses only on a mini-
mum standard: getting kids in the building long 
enough to count them as present. The model does 
not support a strategy to change the live of the 
students.
Now consider a social change approach, one that 
uses evaluation information in entirely different 
ways. In Montgomery County, Maryland, public 
school officials have adopted an evaluation ap-
proach to maximize social change. The approach 
acknowledges education is a complex system 
requiring robust feedback mechanisms during 
the period of the intervention. This is because the 
intervention itself may need to be modified while 
is unfolding.
Instead of waiting until the end of the school year 
to report on a pass-fail statistic—at a time when it 
is too late to change the course for the student—
Montgomery County is investing nearly $50 
million a year on Edline, a data system that co-
ordinates input from multiple sources and sends 
real-time reports to parents and other stakehold-
ers to quickly match kids to interventions.
In describing the system, the Wall Street Journal 
(Hechinger, 2009) tells the story of Duane Wilson, 
a high school senior in Bethesda. During the first 
semester of his senior year, Duane was receiv-
ing low marks in several advanced placement 
courses. With the Edline system, as soon as the 
teacher recorded one of Duane’s low grades, the 
data system automatically sent an e-mail message 
to Duane’s mother. This was enough for Duane’s 
mother to rally her son. Duane picked up his 
grades and gained acceptance to college.
Unlike a thermostat, which responds 
to heat or cold by providing 
resources to change the status quo 
once the current situation becomes 
unacceptable, accountability 
systems simply identify and punish 
performance outside the desired 
range.
3 The Houston scandal over fraudulent dropout data was 
one of the most high-profile examples of the last de-
cade. For details, visit 60 Minutes II story from Aug. 25, 
2004, “The ‘Texas  Miracle,’” http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/01/06/60II/main591676.shtml, or NPR’s 
March 25, 2009, story, “Scandal Surrounds Houston’s High 
School Dropout Rate,” http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=4565125.
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“Like a smoke detector sensing fire, a school 
computer sounded an alarm,” the Journal article 
explains. More than three dozen staffers continu-
ally look for emerging risks across the student 
population. “Alerts of flagging performance come 
from Edline and another data-driven tracking 
system modeled after the one used by the New 
York City Police. The warnings, often sent via 
email, can spark immediate action, such as after-
school tutoring, study sessions and meetings with 
families.”
Unlike the traditional accountability models, the 
system in Montgomery County does not pun-
ish early signs of low performance. The system 
reacts to these signals by supplying additional 
resources in an attempt to change the system, 
to reverse the current direction. This type of 
real-time feedback is already the underpin-
ning of logistics-sector leaders FedEx, UPS, and 
WalMart. Perhaps the closest parallel to public 
schools, in fact, is the Harrah’s casino chain 
(Levinson, 2001), which several years ago ad-
opted a technology solution to providing sweep-
ing, real-time feedback about every individual 
customer engaged.
For the Montgomery schools, over the course 
of an academic year there is no way to predict 
which students will encounter which problems 
at any particular moment, so education officials 
constantly monitor all key variables in the way 
that meteorologists monitor variables on a hur-
ricane. They do not know which intervention to 
implement, for whom or when, until the real-time 
feedback systems yield the relevant information.
Eight Tools for Advancing Social Change
There is much to be said for the notion that suc-
cess hinges on fitting the right tool to the right 
job. That applies here. Much of the frustration 
foundations experience with evaluation efforts 
can be attributed to the wrong tools.
One of the most common complaints, that the 
evaluation reports arrive long after an initiative 
has ended and too late to be actionable, goes to 
the heart of the need to produce rolling, real-time 
updates. A commitment to this type of feedback 
is the only way to manage work occurring within 
complex systems. Likewise, foundations seeking 
to launch ambitious social change agendas are 
frustrated when they are repeatedly confronted 
with simple, linear logic models. Shoehorning the 
information into the boxes on the page satisfies 
a compliance step, but filling out the document 
does nothing to strengthen the underlying logic.
Assuming a static environment, these models also 
assume the foundation is the only player moving 
pieces on the game board. Thus, the models hinge 
more on an ability to predict the future than on 
ability to receive and act on input in real time. 
Anything that deviates from the predetermined 
critical path—a rifle shot—essentially eliminates 
any chance of success.
Below is a list of eight tools that enable founda-
tions to work in a very different way. These tools 
put a maximum on the hard thinking that goes 
along with identifying flaws and hazards in the 
proposed strategy, as well as the willingness to 
set up contingency plans—triggered by tracking a 
set of variables that can serve as warning bells—
and use them as conditions warrant. These tools 
allow foundations to hedge, essentially creating 
multiple opportunities for success.
The list is in no way exhaustive. There are numer-
ous tools and services that support social change 
These tools put a maximum on the 
hard thinking that goes along with 
identifying flaws and hazards in 
the proposed strategy, as well as the 
willingness to set up contingency 
plans—triggered by tracking a set of 
variables that can serve as warning 
bells—and use them as conditions 
warrant. 
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agendas. To identify these resources, foundations 
should be aggressive in looking for practices out-
side the narrow field of nonprofit evaluation.
1. Risk Analysis
The basic questions in risk analysis are the fol-
lowing: (1) What is most likely to go wrong? (2) 
For each potential hazard, what are the potential 
consequences? (3) Considering both the prob-
ability of occurrence and the potential harm, what 
are the highest priority risks to worry about? 
(4) If these risks materialize, what will we do in 
response?
Working through these questions, with founda-
tion staff and grantees, allows for an honest con-
versation about the greatest threats to a strategy. 
It is not acceptable to say that nothing will go 
wrong. Things always go wrong. Always. Success 
hinges on an ability to track variables that will 
sound alarms—and agreeing on threshold levels 
that will trigger the alarm—as risks emerge, en-
abling foundations to activate contingency plans 
or alternative approaches waiting in the wings 
(Bare, 2001).
Foundation and nonprofit staff are rarely asked to 
be up front and candid about what is most likely 
to go wrong. Making risk analysis a central part 
of the work of philanthropy is the quickest way 
to move from an accountability model to a social 
change model.
2. Systems Approaches
Another quick way to move from an accountabil-
ity model to a social change model is to use the 
“Getting to Maybe” tool (shown in Figure 2) to 
differentiate the system in which foundations and 
nonprofits are working.
To fit the right tool to the right situation, it is 
necessary to agree on the nature of the system in 
question. When foundations and nonprofits are 
implementing projects in a simple system, the use 
of simple, linear accountability tools is the right 
move.
When working in complicated or complex sys-
tems, however, foundations and nonprofits must 
select their tools accordingly. Before selecting 
evaluation and management tools to deploy in 
a given setting, determining the nature of the 
system is the correct first step.
3. Testing Assumptions
Just like everyone tells the dentist they brush and 
floss regularly, every foundation and nonprofit 
staffer will report to an evaluator that they have 
considered the assumptions on which their strat-
egy is based.
In most cases this consideration has been carried 
out superficially, if at all. Assumptions are our 
blind spots. By definition, we cannot see our blind 
spots. It requires extraordinary effort, and chal-
lenging input from multiple and varied sources, 
to surface assumptions in an authentic way.
We all see the arrows between the boxes in a 
simple logic model. In this kind of “if, then …” log-
ic, each assertion within a chain of logic rests on 
all kinds of assumptions not depicted literally in 
the model. If the assumptions hold, of course, the 
supposed logical connection between the boxes is 
more likely to play out as planned.
For example, the logic model for a high school 
math intervention may show a simple, causal con-
nection between the time students spend in an 
optional after-school tutoring and the students’ 
performance on the math portion of the school’s 
standardized tests.
This rests on any number of assumptions: that 
students have time to attend the tutoring session 
(and do not have to be present at part-time jobs); 
that students who sample the tutoring will like 
it and come back; that students who stay after 
school for tutoring (and miss the school bus) 
can get transportation home; that the tutor-
ing curriculum lines up with the content of the 
standardized test; that there is a sufficient supply 
of capable tutors; that students most likely to 
perform poorly on the standardized test will elect 
to consume the tutoring; and so on. Perhaps the 
most basic assumption is that the absence of 
tutoring itself is the barrier to students improving 
their performance on the test. If underlying physi-
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cal or mental illness is diminishing the students’ 
learning experience, then the tutoring may miss 
the mark.
Despite the fact that all of these assumptions do 
not show up anywhere in the project’s logic mod-
el, the foundation may want to build in real-time 
feedback systems to track variables associated 
with these questions. Even though these are indi-
rectly related to the initiative, a failed assumption 
will do more to damage chances of success than 
anything else. Repeated, ongoing testing of these 
assumptions can provide the critical feedback to 
monitor the needs of the initiative.
4. The Outside View
Dan Lovallo, a professor with the Australian 
School of Business, and Daniel Kahneman, a 
psychology professor at Princeton University and 
Nobel laureate, published a 2003 article in the 
Harvard Business Review that described a demon 
for many foundations: “delusional optimism.”
The authors identify a set of organizational pres-
sures and cognitive biases that routinely lead ex-
ecutives to inflate their forecasts, especially with 
their own projects: “We overemphasize projects’ 
potential benefits and underestimate likely costs, 
spinning success scenarios while ignoring the 
possibility of mistakes.”
Because the source of the bias is embedded in the 
way our brains process information, this is a dif-
ficult demon to overcome. Lovallo and Kahneman 
(2003) deliver the remedy, what they call “The 
Outside View.” This external view is necessary to 
push back against the internal view, which is the 
source of the delusional optimism.
Pursuing The Outside View requires us to do the 
following:
Select a set of past projects to serve as the •	
reference class.
Assess the distribution of outcomes from proj-•	
ects in this reference class.
Predict your project’s positioning the distribu-•	
tion.
Assess the reliability of your past predictions.•	
Correct your intuitive estimate based on your •	
track record of forecasting.
5. Sensemaking
Karl Weick defines “sensemaking” as “the trans-
formation of raw experience into intelligible 
world views”:
What I’ve repeatedly noticed is that the people who 
really get in trouble during these crises are those who 
try to think everything through before taking any ac-
tion. The problem with defining and redefining your 
hypotheses without testing them is that the world 
keeps changing, and your analyses get further and 
further behind. …
Action, tempered by reflection, is the critical compo-
nent. … Once you start to act, you can flesh out your 
interpretations and rework them. But it’s the action 
itself that gets you moving again. That’s why I advise 
leaders to leap in order to look, or to leap while 
looking. … In crises especially, leaders have to act in 
order to think—and not the other way around. …
I usually urge executives to fight their tendency to 
want to plan everything. Most plans are too specific, 
and the details create the illusion that the plan grasps 
everything that is going on and therefore can be 
trusted. As a result, when you have a plan, you tend 
not to look for things that disconfirm it. … The worst 
aspect of plans is that they heighten the tendency to 
postpone action when something unexpected hap-
pens (Coutu, 2003).
As would be expected, there is a precise list 
of steps to take to undertake sensemaking. In 
general, Weick encourages executives to adopt 
the practices of “high-reliability organizations,” or 
HROs, which have to find ways to perform at high 
levels in volatile environments where unpredict-
able events make most planning processes use-
less. These practices include a constant focus on 
signs of potential failure, even signs staff consider 
as weak. Another practice: refusing to try to sim-
plify complex situations.
6. Game Theory
Foundations are in the decision-making business. 
Game theory is the science of strategic decision 
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making. It follows that game theory is a useful 
discipline for foundation professionals seeking to 
increase the impact of their work.
A decision tree is a basic tool in game theory. In 
many situations, foundation staff can use a deci-
sion tree to depict all the possible decisions, con-
sidering the moves the foundation might make as 
well as moves others may make. This step alone is 
useful in identifying all of the multiple routes to 
success. While the foundation may be heavily in-
vested in a single critical path, a decision tree can 
make explicit all of the decision points along the 
way. This helps illustrate all the courses of action 
that could help, or hurt, the foundation’s chances 
of success.
In a more sophisticated approach, the founda-
tion may assign probabilities to each branch of 
the decision tree, as the model depicts future 
occurrences. This effort not only helps us-
ers identify contingency plans and alternative 
courses of action, it helps users prioritize needs 
and resources.
7. Scenario Planning
Scenario planning is perhaps the polar opposite of 
linear, logic models where success relies on future 
events playing out exactly as planned.
Scenario planning requires participants to imag-
ine and construct a variety of possible futures. 
This is not an effort to predict which future will 
actually materialize. It is not a forecasting com-
petition. Scenario planning requires an explicit 
acknowledgment that the only thing certain about 
the future is that it will be different from today.
Scenario planning forces us to imagine what 
resources and strategies we may need to increase 
our chances of success in a future that will be 
something other what we are experiencing today. 
Whereas traditional planning processes have 
users focusing on short-term variables within 
their control, scenario planning shifts the focus 
to macro-level variables outside of users’ control. 
Once users establish a number of variations on 
what the future may look like at a future date—
say, 10 or 15 years out—the question becomes: 
What do we need to do to be prepared to succeed 
in these different conditions?
The energy company Royal Dutch Shell has been 
a high-profile user of scenarios. On the firm’s Web 
site, the company publishes narratives and video 
versions of energy scenarios for the year 2050 
(http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/
our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/dir_glob-
al_scenarios_07112006.html). In one scenario, 
named “Scramble,” the firm imagines a rapid 
expansion of the coal industry as energy needs 
explode globally without a coordinated response 
by industrialized countries. With nations pursuing 
their own independent approaches to developing 
energy resources, global climate change needs are 
ignored. By 2020, growing transportation needs 
drive up interest in biofuels, which leads to a sharp 
rise in food prices. By 2030, coal production has 
reached its limit globally. By 2040, nations turn to 
nuclear power, but the technology does not deliver 
as expected. By 2050, consumers finally demand 
serious energy efficiency measures.
In another scenario, named “Blueprints,” the firm 
imagines a future where consumers and advo-
cacy groups organize to pressure governments to 
pursue alternative energy strategies. By 2020, this 
slows demand for coal and pushes governments 
to establishing and exploiting new, market-based 
strategies to take alternative energy industries to 
scale. By 2030, electric vehicles enter the mass 
market. By 2050, the world is using about 26 
percent less energy than if it had stayed with the 
old course.
Again, these are not forecasts. These are imagined 
versions of how the world may unfold between 
now and 2050. Whether the future materializes 
in line with either of these scenarios is not the 
point. It is not a contest based on forecasting ac-
curacy. Instead, the exercise challenges executives 
to imagine how dramatically their firms must 
change to succeed in the decades to come. Again, 
the only certainty is that the future will not be like 
today. What is required to succeed today is not 
sufficient to succeed in the future. The status quo 
will not hold. Here is how Shell describes its use 
of scenario planning:
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Shell uses scenarios to explore the future. Our sce-
narios are not mechanical forecasts. They recognise 
that people hold beliefs and make choices that can 
lead down different paths. They reveal different pos-
sible futures that are plausible and challenging. Our 
latest energy scenarios look at the world in the next 
half century, linking the uncertainties we hold about 
the future to the decisions we must make today.
8. Documentary Methods
Through photography, written narratives, audio, 
or video, the documentary method serves as a 
powerful way to explain complex systems that do 
not lend themselves to simple reports. Further, 
the documentary products themselves provide 
feedback in extraordinary ways. The information 
carries great affect and influence, much more so 
than a written report.
Further, because documentary products often 
receive wide circulation, the delivery method 
ensures that individuals who object to the infor-
mation cannot ignore it or keep it secret. The 
distribution systems help ensure documentary 
products are broadly accessible. This empowers 
consumers to invent and reinvent users for the 
products. In effect, documentary products set 
things in motion.
StoryCorps is a prominent producer of radio 
documentaries today. StoryCorps (http://www.
storycorps.org/about) specializes in harvest-
ing oral histories from everyday people, and the 
organization trains users to collect the stories. 
Through StoryBooths and MobileBooths, the 
organization has created fixed sites for individu-
als to use around the country, as well as mobile 
resources that travel from city to city collecting 
stories. Within this general mission, there are 
specific initiatives such as StoryCorps Griot, 
dedicated to preserving the stories of African 
Americans. The stories are archived with the 
National Museum of African American History 
& Culture.
In recent years, documentarians Michael Moore 
and Ken Burns have helped raise the profile of the 
medium. Moore’s documentaries draw audiences 
to movie theaters. By shining light on issues other 
people often would rather not discuss, his proj-
ects have affected the national political debates on 
gun control, health care, and economic inequities. 
The Burns documentaries, which are distributed 
primarily through public television, have helped 
shape the cultural conversations on the Civil War, 
baseball, and jazz.
When former eBay president Jeff Skoll launched 
his philanthropic efforts, he started a firm, Partic-
ipant Media, to advance his social change agenda. 
Through feature films, documentaries and other 
media products, he is able to engage millions of 
users and advance complex ideas. Other methods 
are not robust enough to reach such a large audi-
ence with such ambitious ideas.
Participant Media has managed several high-
profile media projects to completion, including 
Food Inc. and An Inconvenient Truth. Other efforts, 
such as a documentary about the effect of AIDS 
on a South African village, or Darfur Now, which 
examines genocide, are included in the firm’s push 
to move individuals to “social action” (http://www.
participantmedia.com/social_action.php).
The firm’s Web site profiles a long list of projects. 
For each, the “social action” content provides a 
list of “5 Things You Can Do Now.” Here is how 
Participant Media describes its mission:
The company seeks to entertain audiences first, then 
to invite them to participate in making a difference. 
To facilitate this, Participant creates specific social 
action campaigns for each film and documentary 
designed to give a voice to issues that resonate in the 
films. Participant teams with social sector organiza-
tions, non-profits and corporations who are commit-
ted to creating an open forum for discussion, educa-
tion and who can, with Participant, offer specific 
ways for audience members to get involved. These 
include action kits, screening programs, educational 
curriculums and classes, house parties, seminars, 
panels and other activities and are ongoing “legacy” 
programs that are updated and revised to continue 
beyond the film’s domestic and international theatri-
cal, DVD and television windows. To date, Partici-
pant has developed active, working relationships with 
83 non-profits reaching over 20 million people.
Philanthropy, Evaluation, Accountability, and Social Change
2010 Vol 1:4 103
Participant Media’s approach blurs the line 
between for-profit Hollywood projects and do-
gooder nonprofit efforts. It blurs the line between 
entertainment and documentary. As would be 
expected, it does not concern itself with account-
ability questions of whether its offerings fit neatly 
into any traditional category. It is much more 
concerned with authentic social change than 
about short-term, tactical process metrics. In the 
end, Participant Media’s approach is very much 
like that of insurgent teacher David Levin. Par-
ticipant Media will do whatever it takes to move 
individuals to action.
Conclusion: A Call to Action
For foundations and nonprofits to increase the 
impact of their collective investments, philan-
thropy’s leaders must expand their imaginations 
and their toolkits.
In reimagining the work, philanthropy’s leaders 
have an opportunity to take on complex social 
change strategies without apologizing for the 
lack of pound-your-fist-on-the-table certainty. 
The field can leave that kind of certainty to the 
accountability movement’s compliance tools, 
which use bright-line measures to describe dollars 
invested, dollars spent, the number of units of 
services delivered, and the efficiency of imple-
menting inputs. It is important to monitor adher-
ence to minimums. It is just not enough.
Reimagining the work requires something else: It 
means acknowledging that philanthropy cannot 
deconstruct complex problems into a series of 
small, linear projects and expect the sum of the 
parts to add up to large-scale social change. Seek-
ing to extend basic human rights to more individ-
uals around the world, seeking to reduce racism 
in a given city, or seeking to change public-health 
norms in small town — all of these aspirations re-
quire first a willingness to take on challenges that 
defy short-term, causal, quantifiable results at-
tributable to a best practice. It is back to admitting 
foundations are playing a game of pick-up sticks, 
where everyone in the game is moving their sticks 
at the same time. In volatile settings, with short 
time horizons, linear plans that connect inputs to 
outputs lose value as the underlying assumptions 
and conditions change. Foundations cannot gener-
ate outcomes by easily setting off a string of chain 
reactions, like toppling dominoes.
Willing to reimagine the work in this way, foun-
dation and nonprofit executives will discover a 
new set of approaches and tools to support them 
through the experience of “getting to maybe.” The 
tools described here, and other tools that may be 
adapted to complex settings, breathe new energy 
into the work of philanthropy. Just as the imagi-
nation can redefine the work, new tools enable 
philanthropy’s leaders to pursue, manage, and 
evaluate their efforts in powerful ways.
The revelation, across all of the tools, is that foun-
dation and nonprofit executives are freed from 
making precise predictions about how the future 
will play out, with success hinging on forecasting 
exactly what future will unfold. Instead, emphasis 
is placed on tools that inform and support deci-
sions, at each step along the way, that create the 
greatest opportunities for impact across many of 
the possible futures. These tools assume a fixed 
and unwavering commitment to the outcome and 
a readiness to adapt and adjust in terms of what it 
will take to produce the desired impact.
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